From patchwork Mon Jun 20 12:48:54 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg KH X-Patchwork-Id: 584002 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63CD2CCA480 for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:29:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1344848AbiFTN35 (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:29:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50678 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346953AbiFTN3Y (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:29:24 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FFA8248D6; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 06:11:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29B24B811E6; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:11:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 75E4AC341C0; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:11:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655730712; bh=TvSP2+gIKr8wSl72N8VM4swQHZlA8NwkYof9GNkuWzE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FdXgS2APsdnUv0rwIdnRlp7Rlz9zeGFSkZHbJtOJZBCGR66DFkYzX/BRy0bPuqHoL 2H+YllOxQkMpq1a7dZoIuH5OgMQMw6kzyf4jJ/nu7sjyQoDxEWnRbx3VnDgtcbP+ad wkrXoYyqMoZPWQPi+A9a//Rb9ysjOkGOKorcEFKg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Jann Horn , Theodore Tso , Ard Biesheuvel , Eric Biggers , Herbert Xu , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 5.4 033/240] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:48:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20220620124738.831012023@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers commit 118a4417e14348b2e46f5e467da8444ec4757a45 upstream. Remove some dead code that was left over following commit 90ea1c6436d2 ("random: remove the blocking pool"). Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 17 +------- include/trace/events/random.h | 83 ------------------------------------------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -501,7 +501,6 @@ struct entropy_store { unsigned short add_ptr; unsigned short input_rotate; int entropy_count; - unsigned int initialized:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1; __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; @@ -661,7 +660,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo */ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { - int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized = 0; + int entropy_count, orig; const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; @@ -718,23 +717,14 @@ retry: if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - if (has_initialized) { - r->initialized = 1; - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); - } - trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_); if (r == &input_pool) { int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; - if (crng_init < 2) { - if (entropy_bits < 128) - return; + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); - entropy_bits = ENTROPY_BITS(r); - } } } @@ -1392,8 +1382,7 @@ retry: } /* - * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and - * extract_entropy_user. + * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy. * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ --- a/include/trace/events/random.h +++ b/include/trace/events/random.h @@ -85,28 +85,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); -TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) - __field( int, pool_bits ) - __field( int, input_bits ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; - __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits; - __entry->input_bits = input_bits; - ), - - TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d", - __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits, - __entry->input_bits) -); - TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy, TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits), @@ -161,35 +139,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness, MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits) ); -TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits, - int pool_entropy, int input_entropy), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy, - input_entropy), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( const char *, pool_name ) - __field( int, xfer_bits ) - __field( int, request_bits ) - __field( int, pool_entropy ) - __field( int, input_entropy ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->pool_name = pool_name; - __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits; - __entry->request_bits = request_bits; - __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy; - __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy; - ), - - TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d " - "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits, - __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy, - __entry->input_entropy) -); - DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes, TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP), @@ -253,38 +202,6 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, ex TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP) ); -DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user, - TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count, - unsigned long IP), - - TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP) -); - -TRACE_EVENT(random_read, - TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left), - - TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left), - - TP_STRUCT__entry( - __field( int, got_bits ) - __field( int, need_bits ) - __field( int, pool_left ) - __field( int, input_left ) - ), - - TP_fast_assign( - __entry->got_bits = got_bits; - __entry->need_bits = need_bits; - __entry->pool_left = pool_left; - __entry->input_left = input_left; - ), - - TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d " - "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d", - __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left, - __entry->input_left) -); - TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read, TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left), From patchwork Mon Jun 20 12:49:06 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg KH X-Patchwork-Id: 584001 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 951AEC43334 for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:36:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346814AbiFTNgB (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:36:01 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33222 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345367AbiFTNed (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 09:34:33 -0400 Received: from sin.source.kernel.org (sin.source.kernel.org [145.40.73.55]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C268827B3E; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 06:13:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sin.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B548DCE13A2; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:12:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 85DD9C3411B; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:12:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655730753; bh=EOyGJvefq2eF+pEG+3TukxCC4TntO2teRjLIgcGVDbI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JNPGAy3K4HJ0TC+xSXCn33quZYLdWh5PXlJiJ7Rn+i/1KrM1HjIlbiBhta9QPky6P 6p6coYlugh4+0AxNFEgV+TbmVaYSALC+0FDrjQLDWb/c4hK3/v+sZ/FQCfIKX9ied1 gpHdFbNNpJrOoRHCzB7Q8nmzkd+n7RiXklVaSLBk= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Jann Horn , Theodore Tso , Ard Biesheuvel , Eric Biggers , Herbert Xu , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 5.4 045/240] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:49:06 +0200 Message-Id: <20220620124739.358974199@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220620124737.799371052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers commit a181e0fdb2164268274453b5b291589edbb9b22d upstream. On big endian CPUs, the ChaCha20-based CRNG is using the wrong endianness for the ChaCha20 constants. This doesn't matter cryptographically, but technically it means it's not ChaCha20 anymore. Fix it to always use the standard constants. Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- include/crypto/chacha.h | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); crng_init_try_arch(crng); crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(st static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng) { - memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); + chacha_init_consts(crng->state); _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -51,4 +51,12 @@ int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); +static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state) +{ + state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ + state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ + state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */ + state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */ +} + #endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */