From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:28:57 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773181 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E68C3133402; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011034; cv=none; b=tCptxWeSjAZcNrxms3dmc2UCneEUnbY/xFv7Nh2v968LaQcSw5Me1yKVmeD1+2tY6ygvvFSkmJKeymJxULUVOOYRsDbsBBmRjC7qit9TGdudmki19mW5wJcsrv5sKhUaQjgNILJXxuVPnkpHpzfZJujso09kjMhq97D/wtiksU4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011034; c=relaxed/simple; bh=CL+Rj3ZLuJ5la4ZGM017nsWmxKEWlrMPGavFVfobjzQ=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=LOp7UkFz3S/p0RzRcDXRJBI8bxEUsKq6o0hR8ScY41sENN4hXinn/KotRXoeywibQCl31U1AfU15lC5YI90Bf+6q1n+fa8qfsM0JJOXp4I1L4dgeBPWX72dxFjJ2XPeyJ+OpSRiXQzKJ/1Ggx6CVvC0VWF2bO1HujO0O2cBJOB0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=l/GwnRw5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="l/GwnRw5" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=WWVRVO4rk5Tr7MGrSTJbAXSf75JgVNtQ8ev+YYa16zs=; b=l/GwnRw5UzfMaqCsW4OboRGYEx 1en5wnZIj7wZTmkGsJw9OalyZeMt8Fr/GYFwD+TTN+UeMY4Qto/ZOti+Vg0JFBGXcEWN+r214tyXr RJ3DtJMBE5IrZv6vQQSspz3tPiXQGd71UJrWSvuxexeLWwt6K33d7E0nhHaCbehnXsEs=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgh-0001E5-1O; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:11 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgg-00089r-Od; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:10 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 02/21] KVM: pfncache: remove unnecessary exports Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:28:57 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-3-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant There is no need for the existing kvm_gpc_XXX() functions to be exported. Clean up now before additional functions are added in subsequent patches. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Paolo Bonzini v8: - New in this version. --- virt/kvm/pfncache.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c index 10842f1eeeae..f3571f44d9af 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c +++ b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c @@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ bool kvm_gpc_check(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_check); static void *gpc_map(kvm_pfn_t pfn) { @@ -346,7 +345,6 @@ int kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) { return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpc->gpa, len); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_refresh); void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage) @@ -363,7 +361,6 @@ void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm, gpc->pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT; gpc->uhva = KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_init); int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len) { @@ -388,7 +385,6 @@ int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len) } return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpa, len); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_activate); void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) { @@ -426,4 +422,3 @@ void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) gpc_unmap(old_pfn, old_khva); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_deactivate); From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:28:59 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773180 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB137133439; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011035; cv=none; b=Y7JmPw/MkDvocQowXwfS8ot5MKEz6q2YWWMmzkL9lTpRnLyPZA4FPpBTMUuEnTBCudXl7t4xF7dFwUorJOUWTiI9i40hfa+X97vHrbnkYc5ChyZCgkPvZS7MC/cLilkjDX+i0EOmik6e3AFP+zh31e6k3vimsvQl/siRQpEDCBk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011035; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Gjh7KJhrYjooGejRnZYLbWryu6U81mbFlCjbGUevu7k=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=rxOtF+1yv6KjaxpNSeWmzj7/2906U4VuRUb8d551AhVlzpm/3W2VlibSmxgp+q0Wo+LSagIQuZ/uYVAUq5ZnbZEBigZinqETU4g6m5K484B1aRUQ4s39++4GcxGxfk1efRbhsbyAWd1gghHKuUlKifi2FBmHGb2cz+57JCApXJE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=R6SABlyO; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="R6SABlyO" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=dgg90eY5E+PlYWhnmyGMGapEm6KwHKu4vEv19gqCPLo=; b=R6SABlyOYDCcI7WdYVjD8zW0zg Mgct0KIHxF04fvoHoDoAv7J9JHQjKIF5Qj4ykX1Tel7BWJt2gZHDVlL/O3APTkj352N6cjQhPrV7S 3Bjr8kCunaEB68GLNH+sWl2HTQiG8Q2banvc4O0NEhqIL86gNCiCbrx2rkNOeOhpP3M0=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgn-0001EK-JP; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:17 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgn-00089r-AZ; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:17 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 04/21] KVM: pfncache: add a mark-dirty helper Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:28:59 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-5-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant At the moment pages are marked dirty by open-coded calls to mark_page_dirty_in_slot(), directly deferefencing the gpa and memslot from the cache. After a subsequent patch these may not always be set so add a helper now so that caller will protected from the need to know about this detail. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - s/kvm_gpc_mark_dirty/kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot - Add a check for a NULL memslot pointer v8: - Make the helper a static inline. --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index b66c45e7f6f8..16269430006f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -3151,7 +3151,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(struct kvm_vcpu *v, guest_hv_clock->version = ++vcpu->hv_clock.version; - mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc->memslot, gpc->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); + kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot(gpc); read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); trace_kvm_pvclock_update(v->vcpu_id, &vcpu->hv_clock); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index f3327508ae41..2d001a9c6378 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -453,11 +453,11 @@ static void kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *v, bool atomic) } if (user_len2) { - mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc2->memslot, gpc2->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); + kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot(gpc2); read_unlock(&gpc2->lock); } - mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc1->memslot, gpc1->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); + kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot(gpc1); read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags); } @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ void kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *v) WRITE_ONCE(vi->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1); } - mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc->memslot, gpc->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); + kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot(gpc); read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); /* For the per-vCPU lapic vector, deliver it as MSI. */ diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index bbfefd7e612f..5a27b4389d32 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1398,6 +1398,19 @@ int kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len); */ void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc); +/** + * kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot - mark a cached guest page as dirty. + * + * @gpc: struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object. + */ +static inline void kvm_gpc_mark_dirty_in_slot(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&gpc->lock); + if (gpc->memslot) + mark_page_dirty_in_slot(gpc->kvm, gpc->memslot, + gpc->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); +} + void kvm_sigset_activate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_sigset_deactivate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:00 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773179 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D60161353E0; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011043; cv=none; b=Xj/peMRRlo0wFVHO7UJ2TFKd87OAQKw/iNKXke4UREPjhgxfe/3ZbmAEofbYlNCK5auyFgrte4JenCTbFG2yGIQFQF0JC/dH0cAijFDI0YvSNa1ZLcp4Xud/vHraC2+yizOD9PAKydeN/XQbd2tVidLmaVWdqXx9s8Xb4UKNWYI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=M5zJvH5/m8jVnaynyQt2R+l/vQIL/nsO5ImP6ttvz0g=; b=uMY3MgmEX51RonWqqYIGMNYhoN iB4hwT13WDMvS6yNSm07OtC4w5okv1+9RTVQag1eCVkZgVGAKTFwNQ3aS2AB6pDRsUO3whb9tCwH9 Erfo9AfFypgMUbxAas+kWiiKIbOfIIWs7uhLCK6B3fnj6UKp5znWC4YzRBgrBZYAw1FQ=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgq-0001Ec-SL; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:20 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radgq-00089r-Jh; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:20 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 05/21] KVM: pfncache: remove KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN usage Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:00 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-6-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant As noted in [1] the KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN usage flag is never set by any callers of kvm_gpc_init(), which also makes the 'vcpu' argument redundant. Moreover, all existing callers specify KVM_HOST_USES_PFN so the usage check in hva_to_pfn_retry() and hence the 'usage' argument to kvm_gpc_init() are also redundant. Remove the pfn_cache_usage enumeration and remove the redundant arguments, fields of struct gfn_to_hva_cache, and all the related code. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZQiR8IpqOZrOpzHC@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: x86@kernel.org v8: - New in this version. --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 14 ++++----- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 +------ include/linux/kvm_types.h | 8 ----- virt/kvm/pfncache.c | 61 ++++++--------------------------------- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 16269430006f..31cd5d803dae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -12042,7 +12042,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0; vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0; - kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.pv_time, vcpu->kvm, vcpu, KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); + kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.pv_time, vcpu->kvm); if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu)) vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index 2d001a9c6378..e90464225467 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -2108,14 +2108,10 @@ void kvm_xen_init_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) timer_setup(&vcpu->arch.xen.poll_timer, cancel_evtchn_poll, 0); - kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL, - KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); - kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL, - KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); - kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL, - KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); - kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL, - KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); + kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache, vcpu->kvm); + kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache, vcpu->kvm); + kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, vcpu->kvm); + kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, vcpu->kvm); } void kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -2158,7 +2154,7 @@ void kvm_xen_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm) { mutex_init(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock); idr_init(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports); - kvm_gpc_init(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache, kvm, NULL, KVM_HOST_USES_PFN); + kvm_gpc_init(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache, kvm); } void kvm_xen_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 5a27b4389d32..da20b7018cc8 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1318,21 +1318,12 @@ void kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn); * * @gpc: struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object. * @kvm: pointer to kvm instance. - * @vcpu: vCPU to be used for marking pages dirty and to be woken on - * invalidation. - * @usage: indicates if the resulting host physical PFN is used while - * the @vcpu is IN_GUEST_MODE (in which case invalidation of - * the cache from MMU notifiers---but not for KVM memslot - * changes!---will also force @vcpu to exit the guest and - * refresh the cache); and/or if the PFN used directly - * by KVM (and thus needs a kernel virtual mapping). * * This sets up a gfn_to_pfn_cache by initializing locks and assigning the * immutable attributes. Note, the cache must be zero-allocated (or zeroed by * the caller before init). */ -void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm, - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage); +void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm); /** * kvm_gpc_activate - prepare a cached kernel mapping and HPA for a given guest diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_types.h b/include/linux/kvm_types.h index 9d1f7835d8c1..d93f6522b2c3 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_types.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_types.h @@ -49,12 +49,6 @@ typedef u64 hfn_t; typedef hfn_t kvm_pfn_t; -enum pfn_cache_usage { - KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN = BIT(0), - KVM_HOST_USES_PFN = BIT(1), - KVM_GUEST_AND_HOST_USE_PFN = KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN | KVM_HOST_USES_PFN, -}; - struct gfn_to_hva_cache { u64 generation; gpa_t gpa; @@ -69,13 +63,11 @@ struct gfn_to_pfn_cache { unsigned long uhva; struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; struct kvm *kvm; - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; struct list_head list; rwlock_t lock; struct mutex refresh_lock; void *khva; kvm_pfn_t pfn; - enum pfn_cache_usage usage; bool active; bool valid; }; diff --git a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c index f3571f44d9af..6f4b537eb25b 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c +++ b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c @@ -25,9 +25,7 @@ void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool may_block) { - DECLARE_BITMAP(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc; - bool evict_vcpus = false; spin_lock(&kvm->gpc_lock); list_for_each_entry(gpc, &kvm->gpc_list, list) { @@ -37,43 +35,10 @@ void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start, if (gpc->valid && !is_error_noslot_pfn(gpc->pfn) && gpc->uhva >= start && gpc->uhva < end) { gpc->valid = false; - - /* - * If a guest vCPU could be using the physical address, - * it needs to be forced out of guest mode. - */ - if (gpc->usage & KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN) { - if (!evict_vcpus) { - evict_vcpus = true; - bitmap_zero(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS); - } - __set_bit(gpc->vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu_bitmap); - } } write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); } spin_unlock(&kvm->gpc_lock); - - if (evict_vcpus) { - /* - * KVM needs to ensure the vCPU is fully out of guest context - * before allowing the invalidation to continue. - */ - unsigned int req = KVM_REQ_OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE; - bool called; - - /* - * If the OOM reaper is active, then all vCPUs should have - * been stopped already, so perform the request without - * KVM_REQUEST_WAIT and be sad if any needed to be IPI'd. - */ - if (!may_block) - req &= ~KVM_REQUEST_WAIT; - - called = kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask(kvm, req, vcpu_bitmap); - - WARN_ON_ONCE(called && !may_block); - } } bool kvm_gpc_check(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) @@ -206,16 +171,14 @@ static kvm_pfn_t hva_to_pfn_retry(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) * pfn. Note, kmap() and memremap() can both sleep, so this * too must be done outside of gpc->lock! */ - if (gpc->usage & KVM_HOST_USES_PFN) { - if (new_pfn == gpc->pfn) - new_khva = old_khva; - else - new_khva = gpc_map(new_pfn); - - if (!new_khva) { - kvm_release_pfn_clean(new_pfn); - goto out_error; - } + if (new_pfn == gpc->pfn) + new_khva = old_khva; + else + new_khva = gpc_map(new_pfn); + + if (!new_khva) { + kvm_release_pfn_clean(new_pfn); + goto out_error; } write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); @@ -346,18 +309,12 @@ int kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpc->gpa, len); } -void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm, - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage) +void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!usage || (usage & KVM_GUEST_AND_HOST_USE_PFN) != usage); - WARN_ON_ONCE((usage & KVM_GUEST_USES_PFN) && !vcpu); - rwlock_init(&gpc->lock); mutex_init(&gpc->refresh_lock); gpc->kvm = kvm; - gpc->vcpu = vcpu; - gpc->usage = usage; gpc->pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT; gpc->uhva = KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD; } From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:03 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773178 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A889B13540A; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:44 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011046; cv=none; b=L1s1pdmBQLMIzegKLFvodQqj8CXMl3QoHbm6r5O7p+esWkOgyK645qx4EtyZC/978R6uuv+N/xg8hInOkIaPtl1Cg6yCDcujjBBYm3bkV/hK3MG7pQabY+y2v35Jx5/D3vm9ubDRHOpNuMT95adUvWz65inuXIiaUXnrwG99p0g= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011046; c=relaxed/simple; bh=STCYp8hlp+MiB5Ynx/ErSBf64wQDmWMFRv1LIlw8HCs=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=HviJGmoNyhXUbftRQC8HoX/u/3LPm57udp+/37eaIDtY7iYXwOaCs8wLqchqT+sIr45oSVfReIFjEYAN9ZpLFHLJAfeyb2ouPOdG52sfLkJsWrZAJikDE454XFYcWJU1ZTcmE4T8MlmO/8WDXmM44gXzxNN5QZGYoSFX67v8kWE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=cSpmbqk4; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="cSpmbqk4" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=vidRqY/husiNAcsXLmx8RKhnEHcdfKPAREQpb1Abk68=; b=cSpmbqk4igwIM8oZ2HgWyMpq43 urm7g0oevw99lhaMdmHBiEbdyS4CxrFeu9mM4H6zNgEl9vE/rEoK0zDfF1i77IlBV5QQvEMaqObvg adxZbMUr9DIs9reVafS6B37T5+6BwXX998NDHzpJPB3bkq80FaFDBg8c+4YubGWOaFSw=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radh0-0001GG-NC; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:30 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radh0-00089r-EY; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:30 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 08/21] KVM: s390: Refactor kvm_is_error_gpa() into kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot() Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:03 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-9-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Sean Christopherson Rename kvm_is_error_gpa() to kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot() and invert the polarity accordingly in order to (a) free up kvm_is_error_gpa() to match with kvm_is_error_{hva,page}(), and (b) to make it more obvious that the helper is doing a memslot lookup, i.e. not simply checking for INVALID_GPA. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: Janosch Frank Cc: Claudio Imbrenda Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Alexander Gordeev Cc: Sven Schnelle Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org v13: - New in this version. --- arch/s390/kvm/diag.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c | 14 +++++++------- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 4 ++-- arch/s390/kvm/priv.c | 4 ++-- arch/s390/kvm/sigp.c | 2 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c b/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c index 3c65b8258ae6..2a32438e09ce 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/diag.c @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int __diag_page_ref_service(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) parm.token_addr & 7 || parm.zarch != 0x8000000000000000ULL) return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_SPECIFICATION); - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, parm.token_addr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, parm.token_addr)) return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_ADDRESSING); vcpu->arch.pfault_token = parm.token_addr; diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c index 5bfcc50c1a68..415c99649e43 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, case ASCE_TYPE_REGION1: { union region1_table_entry rfte; - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rfte.val)) return -EFAULT; @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2: { union region2_table_entry rste; - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rste.val)) return -EFAULT; @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3: { union region3_table_entry rtte; - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rtte.val)) return -EFAULT; @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT: { union segment_table_entry ste; - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &ste.val)) return -EFAULT; @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, ptr = ste.fc0.pto * (PAGE_SIZE / 2) + vaddr.px * 8; } } - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &pte.val)) return -EFAULT; @@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, *prot = PROT_TYPE_IEP; return PGM_PROTECTION; } - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, raddr.addr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, raddr.addr)) return PGM_ADDRESSING; *gpa = raddr.addr; return 0; @@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ static int guest_range_to_gpas(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long ga, u8 ar, return rc; } else { gpa = kvm_s390_real_to_abs(vcpu, ga); - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) { + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) { rc = PGM_ADDRESSING; prot = PROT_NONE; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index ea63ac769889..3e5a1d7aa81a 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_mem_op_abs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s390_mem_op *mop) srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(kvm, mop->gaddr)) { + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(kvm, mop->gaddr)) { r = PGM_ADDRESSING; goto out_unlock; } @@ -2940,7 +2940,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_mem_op_cmpxchg(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s390_mem_op *m srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(kvm, mop->gaddr)) { + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(kvm, mop->gaddr)) { r = PGM_ADDRESSING; goto out_unlock; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c index 621a17fd1a1b..0ece9c581ebf 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int handle_set_prefix(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * first page, since address is 8k aligned and memory pieces are always * at least 1MB aligned and have at least a size of 1MB. */ - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, address)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, address)) return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_ADDRESSING); kvm_s390_set_prefix(vcpu, address); @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int handle_test_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return kvm_s390_inject_prog_irq(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.pgm); addr = kvm_s390_real_to_abs(vcpu, addr); - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, addr)) + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, addr)) return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_ADDRESSING); /* * We don't expect errors on modern systems, and do not care diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/sigp.c b/arch/s390/kvm/sigp.c index d9696b530064..55c34cb35428 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/sigp.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/sigp.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int __sigp_set_prefix(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, * first page, since address is 8k aligned and memory pieces are always * at least 1MB aligned and have at least a size of 1MB. */ - if (kvm_is_error_gpa(vcpu->kvm, irq.u.prefix.address)) { + if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, irq.u.prefix.address)) { *reg &= 0xffffffff00000000UL; *reg |= SIGP_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; return SIGP_CC_STATUS_STORED; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index da20b7018cc8..41ee515b304e 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1791,11 +1791,11 @@ static inline hpa_t pfn_to_hpa(kvm_pfn_t pfn) return (hpa_t)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; } -static inline bool kvm_is_error_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa) +static inline bool kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa) { unsigned long hva = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa)); - return kvm_is_error_hva(hva); + return !kvm_is_error_hva(hva); } enum kvm_stat_kind { From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773177 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A451132478; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:33 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 09/21] KVM: pfncache: allow a cache to be activated with a fixed (userspace) HVA Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:04 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-10-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant Some pfncache pages may actually be overlays on guest memory that have a fixed HVA within the VMM. It's pointless to invalidate such cached mappings if the overlay is moved so allow a cache to be activated directly with the HVA to cater for such cases. A subsequent patch will make use of this facility. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: David Woodhouse v13: - Define kvm_is_error_gpa() to check GPA validity. - Add an either/or address check to __kvm_gpc_refresh() as requested. - Make sure memslot is NULL if the cache is activated with an HVA. v11: - Fixed kvm_gpc_check() to ignore memslot generation if the cache is not activated with a GPA. (This breakage occured during the re-work for v8). v9: - Pass both GPA and HVA into __kvm_gpc_refresh() rather than overloading the address paraneter and using a bool flag to indicated what it is. v8: - Re-worked to avoid messing with struct gfn_to_pfn_cache. --- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 21 +++++++++ virt/kvm/pfncache.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 41ee515b304e..043cc824d55a 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_is_error_hva(unsigned long addr) #endif +static inline bool kvm_is_error_gpa(gpa_t gpa) +{ + return gpa == INVALID_GPA; +} + #define KVM_ERR_PTR_BAD_PAGE (ERR_PTR(-ENOENT)) static inline bool is_error_page(struct page *page) @@ -1343,6 +1348,22 @@ void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm); */ int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len); +/** + * kvm_gpc_activate_hva - prepare a cached kernel mapping and HPA for a given HVA. + * + * @gpc: struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object. + * @hva: userspace virtual address to map. + * @len: sanity check; the range being access must fit a single page. + * + * @return: 0 for success. + * -EINVAL for a mapping which would cross a page boundary. + * -EFAULT for an untranslatable guest physical address. + * + * The semantics of this function are the same as those of kvm_gpc_activate(). It + * merely bypasses a layer of address translation. + */ +int kvm_gpc_activate_hva(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long hva, unsigned long len); + /** * kvm_gpc_check - check validity of a gfn_to_pfn_cache. * diff --git a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c index 97eec8ee3449..4e64d349b2f7 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c +++ b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c @@ -48,7 +48,14 @@ bool kvm_gpc_check(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) if (!gpc->active) return false; - if (gpc->generation != slots->generation || kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) + /* + * If the page was cached from a memslot, make sure the memslots have + * not been re-configured. + */ + if (!kvm_is_error_gpa(gpc->gpa) && gpc->generation != slots->generation) + return false; + + if (kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) return false; if (offset_in_page(gpc->uhva) + len > PAGE_SIZE) @@ -209,11 +216,11 @@ static kvm_pfn_t hva_to_pfn_retry(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) return -EFAULT; } -static int __kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, +static int __kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long uhva, unsigned long len) { - struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(gpc->kvm); - unsigned long page_offset = offset_in_page(gpa); + unsigned long page_offset = kvm_is_error_gpa(gpa) ? + offset_in_page(uhva) : offset_in_page(gpa); bool unmap_old = false; unsigned long old_uhva; kvm_pfn_t old_pfn; @@ -221,6 +228,10 @@ static int __kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, void *old_khva; int ret; + /* Either gpa or uhva must be valid, but not both */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_error_gpa(gpa) == kvm_is_error_hva(uhva))) + return -EINVAL; + /* * If must fit within a single page. The 'len' argument is * only to enforce that. @@ -246,29 +257,39 @@ static int __kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, old_khva = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN((uintptr_t)gpc->khva); old_uhva = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(gpc->uhva); - /* Refresh the userspace HVA if necessary */ - if (gpc->gpa != gpa || gpc->generation != slots->generation || - kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) { - gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); - - gpc->gpa = gpa; - gpc->generation = slots->generation; - gpc->memslot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn); - gpc->uhva = gfn_to_hva_memslot(gpc->memslot, gfn); + if (kvm_is_error_gpa(gpa)) { + gpc->gpa = INVALID_GPA; + gpc->memslot = NULL; + gpc->uhva = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(uhva); - if (kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - /* - * Even if the GPA and/or the memslot generation changed, the - * HVA may still be the same. - */ if (gpc->uhva != old_uhva) hva_change = true; } else { - gpc->uhva = old_uhva; + struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(gpc->kvm); + + if (gpc->gpa != gpa || gpc->generation != slots->generation || + kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) { + gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); + + gpc->gpa = gpa; + gpc->generation = slots->generation; + gpc->memslot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn); + gpc->uhva = gfn_to_hva_memslot(gpc->memslot, gfn); + + if (kvm_is_error_hva(gpc->uhva)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Even if the GPA and/or the memslot generation changed, the + * HVA may still be the same. + */ + if (gpc->uhva != old_uhva) + hva_change = true; + } else { + gpc->uhva = old_uhva; + } } /* Note: the offset must be correct before calling hva_to_pfn_retry() */ @@ -319,7 +340,16 @@ static int __kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, int kvm_gpc_refresh(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long len) { - return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpc->gpa, len); + unsigned long uhva = gpc->uhva; + + /* + * If the GPA is valid then invalidate the HVA, otherwise + * __kvm_gpc_refresh() will fail its strict either/or address check. + */ + if (!kvm_is_error_gpa(gpc->gpa)) + uhva = KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD; + + return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpc->gpa, uhva, len); } void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm) @@ -329,10 +359,12 @@ void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, struct kvm *kvm) gpc->kvm = kvm; gpc->pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT; + gpc->gpa = INVALID_GPA; gpc->uhva = KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD; } -int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len) +static int __kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long uhva, + unsigned long len) { struct kvm *kvm = gpc->kvm; @@ -353,7 +385,17 @@ int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len) gpc->active = true; write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); } - return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpa, len); + return __kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, gpa, uhva, len); +} + +int kvm_gpc_activate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len) +{ + return __kvm_gpc_activate(gpc, gpa, KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD, len); +} + +int kvm_gpc_activate_hva(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc, unsigned long uhva, unsigned long len) +{ + return __kvm_gpc_activate(gpc, INVALID_GPA, uhva, len); } void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc) From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773172 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CED6A134CF3; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011877; cv=none; b=G4UPgVuRKlJ0Lfo+m+vQoll61DF8CWPK/hVMMm9aiH/7dPW2KpliJbTjbnyZkJLwr4Pi9R3aNkYunV6FG3uWl7kisA6Ck1AlpqGMN73auO0kHqVOaZ1SYwZwVUz3QGKMu+LGWDpuESVnPRR9+aXhBhjWlZ5IonTl9gWOkbwj7gM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011877; c=relaxed/simple; bh=szYE4dBrS14T5FnVhn+t4sIXYh2/J0t9jHt/WAPjtCM=; 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bh=1MkSaLF7c08GKXChco4qld/H7sOx3qJp6Y3BVchMvB4=; b=LDDATzJUtbk4aXB5cGW8Z7kXBN /U8PGPAtsqIfrudSvWx+sTGNOOsS+AemAudbmeHvIKgE6EoG3uGIQ6rslkmMeC6JD50m2Ejy8NTQ/ BOjU0elxcCBcnnHbqc/5/KUIq3GT7jFCvAg1Y7CJquhTXVqh0V8LGNRKVoPaOSpzT+hI=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1raduL-0001WO-V7; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:17 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radh7-00089r-0K; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:37 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 10/21] KVM: x86/xen: separate initialization of shared_info cache and content Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:05 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-11-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant A subsequent patch will allow shared_info to be initialized using either a GPA or a user-space (i.e. VMM) HVA. To make that patch cleaner, separate the initialization of the shared_info content from the activation of the pfncache. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - Patch title change. v11: - Fix accidental regression from commit 5d6d6a7d7e66a ("KVM: x86: Refine calculation of guest wall clock to use a single TSC read"). v10: - New in this version. --- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index e90464225467..031e98d88ba2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -34,41 +34,32 @@ static bool kvm_xen_hcall_evtchn_send(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 param, u64 *r); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(kvm_xen_enabled, HZ); -static int kvm_xen_shared_info_init(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) +static int kvm_xen_shared_info_init(struct kvm *kvm) { struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache; struct pvclock_wall_clock *wc; - gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn); u32 *wc_sec_hi; u32 wc_version; u64 wall_nsec; int ret = 0; int idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); - if (gfn == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GFN) { - kvm_gpc_deactivate(gpc); - goto out; - } + read_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); + while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, PAGE_SIZE)) { + read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); - do { - ret = kvm_gpc_activate(gpc, gpa, PAGE_SIZE); + ret = kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, PAGE_SIZE); if (ret) goto out; - /* - * This code mirrors kvm_write_wall_clock() except that it writes - * directly through the pfn cache and doesn't mark the page dirty. - */ - wall_nsec = kvm_get_wall_clock_epoch(kvm); - - /* It could be invalid again already, so we need to check */ read_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); + } - if (gpc->valid) - break; - - read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); - } while (1); + /* + * This code mirrors kvm_write_wall_clock() except that it writes + * directly through the pfn cache and doesn't mark the page dirty. + */ + wall_nsec = kvm_get_wall_clock_epoch(kvm); /* Paranoia checks on the 32-bit struct layout */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_shared_info, wc) != 0x900); @@ -639,12 +630,30 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data) } break; - case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO: + case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO: { + int idx; + mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock); - r = kvm_xen_shared_info_init(kvm, data->u.shared_info.gfn); + + idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); + + if (data->u.shared_info.gfn == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GFN) { + kvm_gpc_deactivate(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache); + r = 0; + } else { + r = kvm_gpc_activate(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache, + gfn_to_gpa(data->u.shared_info.gfn), + PAGE_SIZE); + } + + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx); + + if (!r && kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache.active) + r = kvm_xen_shared_info_init(kvm); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock); break; - + } case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR: if (data->u.vector && data->u.vector < 0x10) r = -EINVAL; From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:08 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773174 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A371E1339A3; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:30:47 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 13/21] KVM: x86/xen: allow vcpu_info to be mapped by fixed HVA Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:08 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-14-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant If the guest does not explicitly set the GPA of vcpu_info structure in memory then, for guests with 32 vCPUs or fewer, the vcpu_info embedded in the shared_info page may be used. As described in a previous commit, the shared_info page is an overlay at a fixed HVA within the VMM, so in this case it also more optimal to activate the vcpu_info cache with a fixed HVA to avoid unnecessary invalidation if the guest memory layout is modified. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - Patch title change. v8: - Re-base. v5: - New in this version. --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 3372be85b335..bd93cafd3e4e 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -5523,11 +5523,12 @@ KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO Sets the guest physical frame number at which the Xen shared_info page resides. Note that although Xen places vcpu_info for the first 32 vCPUs in the shared_info page, KVM does not automatically do so - and instead requires that KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO be used - explicitly even when the vcpu_info for a given vCPU resides at the - "default" location in the shared_info page. This is because KVM may - not be aware of the Xen CPU id which is used as the index into the - vcpu_info[] array, so may know the correct default location. + and instead requires that KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO or + KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA be used explicitly even when + the vcpu_info for a given vCPU resides at the "default" location + in the shared_info page. This is because KVM may not be aware of + the Xen CPU id which is used as the index into the vcpu_info[] + array, so may know the correct default location. Note that the shared_info page may be constantly written to by KVM; it contains the event channel bitmap used to deliver interrupts to @@ -5649,6 +5650,21 @@ KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO on dirty logging. Setting the gpa to KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA will disable the vcpu_info. +KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA + If the KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA flag is also set in the + Xen capabilities, then this attribute may be used to set the + userspace address of the vcpu_info for a given vCPU. It should + only be used when the vcpu_info resides at the "default" location + in the shared_info page. In this case it is safe to assume the + userspace address will not change, because the shared_info page is + an overlay on guest memory and remains at a fixed host address + regardless of where it is mapped in guest physical address space + and hence unnecessary invalidation of an internal cache may be + avoided if the guest memory layout is modified. + If the vcpu_info does not reside at the "default" location then + it is not guaranteed to remain at the same host address and + hence the aforementioned cache invalidation is required. + KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_TIME_INFO Sets the guest physical address of an additional pvclock structure for a given vCPU. This is typically used for guest vsyscall support. diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index 6fb268e424fa..4e79cc68e0a9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -784,20 +784,33 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data) switch (data->type) { case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO: + case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA: /* No compat necessary here. */ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vcpu_info) != sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_info)); BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_info, time) != offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time)); - if (data->u.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) { - kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache); - r = 0; - break; + if (data->type == KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO) { + if (data->u.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) { + kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache); + r = 0; + break; + } + + r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, + data->u.gpa, sizeof(struct vcpu_info)); + } else { + if (data->u.hva == 0) { + kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache); + r = 0; + break; + } + + r = kvm_gpc_activate_hva(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, + data->u.hva, sizeof(struct vcpu_info)); } - r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, - data->u.gpa, sizeof(struct vcpu_info)); if (!r) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu); @@ -1026,6 +1039,15 @@ int kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data) r = 0; break; + case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA: + if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.active && + vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) + data->u.hva = vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.uhva; + else + data->u.hva = 0; + r = 0; + break; + case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_TIME_INFO: if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.active) data->u.gpa = vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.gpa; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index ac5caba313d1..d2665319db6e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1809,6 +1809,7 @@ struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr { union { __u64 gpa; #define KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA ((__u64)-1) + __u64 hva; __u64 pad[8]; struct { __u64 state; @@ -1839,6 +1840,8 @@ struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr { #define KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_ID 0x6 #define KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_TIMER 0x7 #define KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR 0x8 +/* Available with KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM / KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA */ +#define KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA 0x9 /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */ enum sev_cmd_id { From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:11 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773173 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 870121339BD; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; 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Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 16/21] KVM: x86/xen: advertize the KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA capability Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:11 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-17-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant Now that all relevant kernel changes and selftests are in place, enable the new capability. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - Patch title change. v2: - New in this version. --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 31cd5d803dae..9f98c5075629 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -4673,7 +4673,8 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO | KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL | KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND | - KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE; + KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE | + KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO_HVA; if (sched_info_on()) r |= KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE | KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG; From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:12 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773171 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 881FC1350F8; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011878; cv=none; b=ip6/dm2Sye0JDiM8Ql/IrgkHjtJadDfPJmjFQVbRjnBakXPApTFUtVoIrSeHImfjU2OUVkCrquckc7Mqqqv7eRCyAGjvOFiI8ffDs0HBmKbs6nz6qHXspON/obVLx7D4ZyuLzC1m+OKeGQcWkO98OxDnP7BL9EsAkjnobr1QKG4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011878; c=relaxed/simple; bh=GEl0WYcie8FwL3loZwHXIRILLofrgvbERfHmVRWJWXg=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=E9BbKBg3Tql09a5wE449H2pbjpdXtR8yOaq7kGKWSn/PZXPsakQEVp9/MowQCNco5TykseLt9iiBv1MQ5sjK9cf2uOco7fY8mLCCmytBaQdKx1NQZociE6OBF64L13uNcQc1rI1hI2lN4Ox6ZyWY81ztzJMIbQyTIrGeaSjrNtI= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=TEblCqH/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="TEblCqH/" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=ghGe5PwDz8Z1vSkOspvGb/Fj1hJgFrWoWha0X2F78wA=; b=TEblCqH/HbkA9GJLgGlZwzaSP1 8bj7s92+h2LTJ43aknECcqYYCIr1jlt8TnhEa4JN480IA9mOk27WADE63NbQi4Tw3q0PXM6pn0A+C lgcEMrHQ7U/y2kZKzo9k0ymT7rChoavhH4oiSIFqHeJvxbOaOg54ApsfL5foVbRdVOE4=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1raduM-0001WU-5T; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:18 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radhT-00089r-V2; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:31:00 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 17/21] KVM: x86/xen: split up kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast() Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:12 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-18-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant The implementation of kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast() is a rather lengthy piece of code that performs two operations: updating of the shared_info evtchn_pending mask, and updating of the vcpu_info evtchn_pending_sel mask. Introduce a separate function to perform each of those operations and re-work kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast() to use them. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - Patch title change. v11: - Fixed /64 vs /32 switcheroo and changed type of port_word_bit back to int. v10: - Updated in this version. Dropped David'd R-b since the updates are non-trivial. v8: - New in this version. --- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index 4e79cc68e0a9..59073642c078 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -1670,6 +1670,101 @@ static void kvm_xen_check_poller(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int port) } } +static int set_shinfo_evtchn_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 port) +{ + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache; + unsigned long *pending_bits, *mask_bits; + unsigned long flags; + int rc = -EWOULDBLOCK; + + read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); + if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, PAGE_SIZE)) + goto out; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) { + struct shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva; + + pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending; + mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask; + } else { + struct compat_shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva; + + pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending; + mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask; + } + + if (test_and_set_bit(port, pending_bits)) { + rc = 0; /* It was already raised */ + } else if (test_bit(port, mask_bits)) { + rc = -ENOTCONN; /* It is masked */ + kvm_xen_check_poller(vcpu, port); + } else { + rc = 1; /* It is newly raised */ + } + + out: + read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); + return rc; +} + +static bool set_vcpu_info_evtchn_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 port) +{ + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache; + unsigned long flags; + bool kick_vcpu = false; + + read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); + + /* + * Try to deliver the event directly to the vcpu_info. If successful and + * the guest is using upcall_vector delivery, send the MSI. + * If the pfncache is invalid, set the shadow. In this case, or if the + * guest is using another form of event delivery, the vCPU must be + * kicked to complete the delivery. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) { + struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva; + int port_word_bit = port / 64; + + if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(*vcpu_info))) { + if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel)) + kick_vcpu = true; + goto out; + } + + if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) { + WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1); + kick_vcpu = true; + } + } else { + struct compat_vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva; + int port_word_bit = port / 32; + + if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(*vcpu_info))) { + if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel)) + kick_vcpu = true; + goto out; + } + + if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, + (unsigned long *)&vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) { + WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1); + kick_vcpu = true; + } + } + + if (kick_vcpu && vcpu->arch.xen.upcall_vector) { + kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector(vcpu); + kick_vcpu = false; + } + + out: + read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); + return kick_vcpu; +} + /* * The return value from this function is propagated to kvm_set_irq() API, * so it returns: @@ -1678,15 +1773,12 @@ static void kvm_xen_check_poller(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int port) * > 0 Number of CPUs interrupt was delivered to * * It is also called directly from kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic(), where the - * only check on its return value is a comparison with -EWOULDBLOCK'. + * only check on its return value is a comparison with -EWOULDBLOCK + * (which may be returned by set_shinfo_evtchn_pending()). */ int kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm) { - struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache; struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; - unsigned long *pending_bits, *mask_bits; - unsigned long flags; - int port_word_bit; bool kick_vcpu = false; int vcpu_idx, idx, rc; @@ -1706,79 +1798,12 @@ int kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm) if (xe->port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm)) return -EINVAL; - rc = -EWOULDBLOCK; - idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); - read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); - if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, PAGE_SIZE)) - goto out_rcu; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) { - struct shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva; - pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending; - mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask; - port_word_bit = xe->port / 64; - } else { - struct compat_shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva; - pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending; - mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask; - port_word_bit = xe->port / 32; - } + rc = set_shinfo_evtchn_pending(vcpu, xe->port); + if (rc == 1) /* Delivered to the bitmap in shared_info */ + kick_vcpu = set_vcpu_info_evtchn_pending(vcpu, xe->port); - /* - * If this port wasn't already set, and if it isn't masked, then - * we try to set the corresponding bit in the in-kernel shadow of - * evtchn_pending_sel for the target vCPU. And if *that* wasn't - * already set, then we kick the vCPU in question to write to the - * *real* evtchn_pending_sel in its own guest vcpu_info struct. - */ - if (test_and_set_bit(xe->port, pending_bits)) { - rc = 0; /* It was already raised */ - } else if (test_bit(xe->port, mask_bits)) { - rc = -ENOTCONN; /* Masked */ - kvm_xen_check_poller(vcpu, xe->port); - } else { - rc = 1; /* Delivered to the bitmap in shared_info. */ - /* Now switch to the vCPU's vcpu_info to set the index and pending_sel */ - read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); - gpc = &vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache; - - read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags); - if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info))) { - /* - * Could not access the vcpu_info. Set the bit in-kernel - * and prod the vCPU to deliver it for itself. - */ - if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel)) - kick_vcpu = true; - goto out_rcu; - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) { - struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva; - if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) { - WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1); - kick_vcpu = true; - } - } else { - struct compat_vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva; - if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, - (unsigned long *)&vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) { - WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1); - kick_vcpu = true; - } - } - - /* For the per-vCPU lapic vector, deliver it as MSI. */ - if (kick_vcpu && vcpu->arch.xen.upcall_vector) { - kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector(vcpu); - kick_vcpu = false; - } - } - - out_rcu: - read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags); srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx); if (kick_vcpu) { From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:14 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773175 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23D42133988; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011874; cv=none; b=ElBPpwr3jAzrjbYA9jkE2YXXAvZKcKtM/PBJ7n1kiwlRsh9bTQB4dhuT7LzNymHTtuV5jzVZNgTNMt7nNZMDtlBnw+W02LAUS19F+wpplPTSUTBIo4yQess1ym0k1feFstL65cg77YscgRIF6lQ3o2Lutbx7DSWry+gCxj+285I= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011874; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VRnws1u5TYtqSIKl1DEqeV2+fWCO5s7JpMyqvcgXJYM=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=nR5zQBSpQA/ogZzfb5pjv06v7F7+2ODuWO6jCo87akvS24rj/Ca6RsJRf3c6Fp18tV758o3pzmP+zhWFNoi8sqvrBe/IoewduwSHpVumQ0rD0sTltUc0FWZKMyg2p3j/8bkdiXMoNGcAZuOAcujrh9Bdvptb6m+8Njzw5KrxwvY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=sISZNeaz; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="sISZNeaz" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=oWxMi1Cq+3Oy+z1gazw2wQP+W9Y2VE65Jj+9Nc1gV68=; b=sISZNeazYwXkmpW0QAtc8+qM7X OL8hHyHTqik5cMz7/ZF2Waa781QdxDJFHdexNBwSXkTl7ypiR4boD8SkdUWWPttcH0188tvtNFpgV lxcv5DL+NECOzEQBPJPtSDb1V/DCcDGjpZomHyNLbBBgj30oOyngWldXLu285+EG63Tg=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1raduM-0001Wa-Ck; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:18 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radha-00089r-Gp; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:31:06 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 19/21] KVM: pfncache: check the need for invalidation under read lock first Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:14 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-20-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant When processing mmu_notifier invalidations for gpc caches, pre-check for overlap with the invalidation event while holding gpc->lock for read, and only take gpc->lock for write if the cache needs to be invalidated. Doing a pre-check without taking gpc->lock for write avoids unnecessarily contending the lock for unrelated invalidations, which is very beneficial for caches that are heavily used (but rarely subjected to mmu_notifier invalidations). Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: David Woodhouse v13: - Use Sean's preferred wording for the commit comment. v10: - New in this version. --- virt/kvm/pfncache.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c index 4e64d349b2f7..a60d8f906896 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/pfncache.c +++ b/virt/kvm/pfncache.c @@ -29,14 +29,30 @@ void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start, spin_lock(&kvm->gpc_lock); list_for_each_entry(gpc, &kvm->gpc_list, list) { - write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); + read_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); /* Only a single page so no need to care about length */ if (gpc->valid && !is_error_noslot_pfn(gpc->pfn) && gpc->uhva >= start && gpc->uhva < end) { - gpc->valid = false; + read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); + + /* + * There is a small window here where the cache could + * be modified, and invalidation would no longer be + * necessary. Hence check again whether invalidation + * is still necessary once the write lock has been + * acquired. + */ + + write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock); + if (gpc->valid && !is_error_noslot_pfn(gpc->pfn) && + gpc->uhva >= start && gpc->uhva < end) + gpc->valid = false; + write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); + continue; } - write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); + + read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock); } spin_unlock(&kvm->gpc_lock); } From patchwork Thu Feb 15 15:29:15 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Durrant X-Patchwork-Id: 773176 Received: from mail.xenproject.org (mail.xenproject.org [104.130.215.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 822B8131E32; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011872; cv=none; b=u3tau9wW1xXZF/ic6t0Z2NqTe+seSHubrVhy+QsC6EBxxhnWmM21cQ48Tf7Gde068ISvNdv1BqK32PP5bENKcy8S/ZpYaY+igy647U+ZXa9TBvQzC4FCC8SltQt/TPRO/ai9c7ZxwjaI3rFZOYm4A61U58ZMJP3qd0k5OMJE41Q= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708011872; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tf6LMRayvs8aoSZxiqZEwaZ7V5TgcIo9fVJuyWSO+FU=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=MIbkIkbfq95LFtAdnYBXvTYW5WXkvUI8pwJCZxe9tw9Hqj+ruhCEzlj1fO1wU8tQzkYNKaSxV/lTzsaWJsrgjFPtPcE8qhoJq/JIo+dyZG8J1OOAMEFPhPa9jsLDTDgWkvGtq9WimbL5LCb3gw4Z6FKiK6Be9tjzIBpBjbbBNnM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b=wOERm6ZT; arc=none smtp.client-ip=104.130.215.37 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=xen.org header.i=@xen.org header.b="wOERm6ZT" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xen.org; s=20200302mail; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:References: In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date:Subject:To:From; bh=I+0HAEEY7B8ebrh7W7mzXaPfOq28o4tU8rT0p+AqpXE=; b=wOERm6ZTM/pzHUgQEadMvJJAX3 PDRpCWSkDxShRD5XRBxbf1et0sPLU3iAt1IbskBDHW/J8BU/g8YpTS1anHfvaF0bKlU1WFfLcbMFz JDd+Zzm2ACaDvFpGoWLTWLSyL0gFq+2eJ/LcA/mJQz/1+DJF0P7MkfJcWIWbsgx6sf18=; Received: from xenbits.xenproject.org ([104.239.192.120]) by mail.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1raduL-0001WM-SP; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:17 +0000 Received: from 54-240-197-226.amazon.com ([54.240.197.226] helo=REM-PW02S00X.ant.amazon.com) by xenbits.xenproject.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1radhd-00089r-Po; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:31:10 +0000 From: Paul Durrant To: Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank , Claudio Imbrenda , David Hildenbrand , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Sven Schnelle , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , David Woodhouse , Paul Durrant , Shuah Khan , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 20/21] KVM: x86/xen: allow vcpu_info content to be 'safely' copied Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:29:15 +0000 Message-Id: <20240215152916.1158-21-paul@xen.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> References: <20240215152916.1158-1-paul@xen.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Durrant If the guest sets an explicit vcpu_info GPA then, for any of the first 32 vCPUs, the content of the default vcpu_info in the shared_info page must be copied into the new location. Because this copy may race with event delivery (which updates the 'evtchn_pending_sel' field in vcpu_info) there needs to be a way to defer that until the copy is complete. Happily there is already a shadow of 'evtchn_pending_sel' in kvm_vcpu_xen that is used in atomic context if the vcpu_info PFN cache has been invalidated so that the update of vcpu_info can be deferred until the cache can be refreshed (on vCPU thread's the way back into guest context). Also use this shadow if the vcpu_info cache has been *deactivated*, so that the VMM can safely copy the vcpu_info content and then re-activate the cache with the new GPA. To do this, stop considering an inactive vcpu_info cache as a hard error in kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(). Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse --- Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: x86@kernel.org v13: - Patch title change. v8: - Update commit comment. v6: - New in this version. --- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c index 8650141b266e..11ab62ca011d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c @@ -1802,9 +1802,6 @@ int kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm) WRITE_ONCE(xe->vcpu_idx, vcpu->vcpu_idx); } - if (!vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.active) - return -EINVAL; - if (xe->port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm)) return -EINVAL;