From patchwork Fri Dec 4 08:01:36 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 338458 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E154EC4167B for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:01:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E784227C3 for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 08:01:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728448AbgLDIBM (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:01:12 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:58900 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728006AbgLDIBM (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 03:01:12 -0500 Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:01:36 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1607068832; bh=KbgMLWqu/q/WfIjx7vih5Bs5YLK0QKMwGERH9O/ubkE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:From; b=VzU1lt65LOCZwL6xXpN/k9rdNdUmEb5is/1GPcR1Q0O51OtSQgt7jyUn6eSonrejc i2clp31L7xVq1iFzeqiv4420SaaXW5GyzGrsIQWG8D2bvtr1K0M6im9bBL6vjteXqY 8NS46T/TpJhjnYUUsZWRfpQLviGe3GDIJyqNci4g= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: David Howells , Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ilil Blum Shem-Tov Subject: [PATCH] crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit() instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory anymore. Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 378b18b9bc34..84a5d6af9609 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf) memcpy(cur, e, sizeof(e)); cur += sizeof(e); /* Zero parameters to satisfy set_pub_key ABI. */ - memset(cur, 0, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(cur, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE); return cur - buf; }