diff mbox series

[Xen-devel,for-4.12,v2,02/17] xen/arm: traps: Move the implementation of GUEST_BUG_ON in traps.h

Message ID 20181204202651.8836-3-julien.grall@arm.com
State New
Headers show
Series xen/arm: Implement Set/Way operations | expand

Commit Message

Julien Grall Dec. 4, 2018, 8:26 p.m. UTC 
GUEST_BUG_ON may be used in other files doing guest emulation.

Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>

---

    The patch was previously sent separately.

    Changes in v2:
        - Add Stefano's acked-by
---
 xen/arch/arm/traps.c        | 24 ------------------------
 xen/include/asm-arm/traps.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
index c05a8ad25c..94fe1a6da7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
@@ -67,30 +67,6 @@  static inline void check_stack_alignment_constraints(void) {
 #endif
 }
 
-/*
- * GUEST_BUG_ON is intended for checking that the guest state has not been
- * corrupted in hardware and/or that the hardware behaves as we
- * believe it should (i.e. that certain traps can only occur when the
- * guest is in a particular mode).
- *
- * The intention is to limit the damage such h/w bugs (or spec
- * misunderstandings) can do by turning them into Denial of Service
- * attacks instead of e.g. information leaks or privilege escalations.
- *
- * GUEST_BUG_ON *MUST* *NOT* be used to check for guest controllable state!
- *
- * Compared with regular BUG_ON it dumps the guest vcpu state instead
- * of Xen's state.
- */
-#define guest_bug_on_failed(p)                          \
-do {                                                    \
-    show_execution_state(guest_cpu_user_regs());        \
-    panic("Guest Bug: %pv: '%s', line %d, file %s\n",   \
-          current, p, __LINE__, __FILE__);              \
-} while (0)
-#define GUEST_BUG_ON(p) \
-    do { if ( unlikely(p) ) guest_bug_on_failed(#p); } while (0)
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_32
 static int debug_stack_lines = 20;
 #define stack_words_per_line 8
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/traps.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/traps.h
index 6d8a43a691..997c37884e 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/traps.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/traps.h
@@ -10,6 +10,30 @@ 
 # include <asm/arm64/traps.h>
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * GUEST_BUG_ON is intended for checking that the guest state has not been
+ * corrupted in hardware and/or that the hardware behaves as we
+ * believe it should (i.e. that certain traps can only occur when the
+ * guest is in a particular mode).
+ *
+ * The intention is to limit the damage such h/w bugs (or spec
+ * misunderstandings) can do by turning them into Denial of Service
+ * attacks instead of e.g. information leaks or privilege escalations.
+ *
+ * GUEST_BUG_ON *MUST* *NOT* be used to check for guest controllable state!
+ *
+ * Compared with regular BUG_ON it dumps the guest vcpu state instead
+ * of Xen's state.
+ */
+#define guest_bug_on_failed(p)                          \
+do {                                                    \
+    show_execution_state(guest_cpu_user_regs());        \
+    panic("Guest Bug: %pv: '%s', line %d, file %s\n",   \
+          current, p, __LINE__, __FILE__);              \
+} while (0)
+#define GUEST_BUG_ON(p) \
+    do { if ( unlikely(p) ) guest_bug_on_failed(#p); } while (0)
+
 int check_conditional_instr(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, const union hsr hsr);
 
 void advance_pc(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, const union hsr hsr);